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DOMINATION AND THE FREE WILL DEFENSE:  
A REPLY TO PRUSS
Daniel Speak
Few arguments have enjoyed as strong a reputation for philosophical success 
as Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense (FWD). Despite the striking reputation 
for decisiveness, however, concerns about the success of the FWD have begun 
to trickle into the philosophical literature. In a recent article in this journal, 
Alexander Pruss has contributed to this flow with an intriguing argument 
that a proposition necessary to the success of Plantinga’s FWD is false. Spe-
cifically, Pruss has argued, contrary to the FWD, that, necessarily, God is able 
to actualize a world containing at least one significantly free creature who 
never does anything morally wrong. Thus, Pruss purports to demonstrate 
that it is not possible that every creaturely essence suffers from transworld 
depravity. Since the possibility of universal transworld depravity is essen-
tial to Plantinga’s defense, Pruss concludes that the defense in its Plantingian 
form ultimately fails. After presenting Pruss’s argument, I argue that the free 
will defender can resist it, in large part because the free will defender can 
quite reasonably reject the dominance principle on which the supposed coun-
terexample depends.
Few arguments have enjoyed as strong a reputation for philosophical 
success as Alvin Plantinga’s free will defense (FWD). Despite the striking 
reputation for decisiveness, however, concerns about the success of the 
FWD have begun to trickle into the philosophical literature. In fact, this 
may understate the situation; it may be more accurate to describe the flow 
of complaints as substantially more than a trickle.1 In a recent article in this 
journal, Alexander Pruss has contributed to this flow with an intriguing 
argument that a proposition necessary to the success of Plantinga’s FWD 
1For example: Keith DeRose, “Plantinga, Presumption, Possibility, and the Problem of 
Evil,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 21 (1991), 497–512; Daniel Howard-Snyder and John 
O’Leary-Hawthorne, “Transworld Sanctity and Plantinga’s Free Will Defense,” International 
Journal for the Philosophy of Religion 44 (1998), 1–21; Marilyn Adams, Horrendous Evils and 
the Goodness of God (Cornell University Press, 1999); Richard Otte, “Transworld Depravity 
and Unobtainable Worlds,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 78 (2009) 165–177; Jeff 
Speaks, “Foreknowledge, Evil, and Compatibility Arguments,” Faith and Philosophy 28 (2011), 
528–562; and Daniel Howard-Snyder, “The Logical Problem of Evil: Mackie and Plantinga,” 
in The Blackwell Companion to the Problem of Evil, ed. Justin McBrayer and Daniel Howard-
Snyder (Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).
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is false.2 Specifically, Pruss has argued, contrary to the FWD, that, neces-
sarily, God is able to actualize a “morally perfect world”—that is, a world 
containing at least one significantly free creature who never does anything 
morally wrong. Thus, Pruss purports to demonstrate that it is not, after all, 
possible that every creaturely essence suffers from transworld depravity. 
Since the possibility of universal transworld depravity is essential to 
Plantinga’s defense, Pruss concludes that the defense in its Plantingian 
form ultimately fails. After presenting Pruss’s argument, I argue that the 
free will defender can resist it, in large part because the free will defender 
can quite reasonably reject the dominance principle on which the sup-
posed counterexample depends.
1. Pruss’s Argument
Let’s remind ourselves that Plantinga formulated his free will defense as 
a response to logical versions of the problem of evil that claimed to iden-
tify an inconsistency in the set of propositions theists typically endorse. 
In the face of this version of the problem, the goal of the FWD was to 
defend the broadly logical compatibility of God and evil.3 Crucial to the 
success of Plantinga’s defense was his argument for the claim that, pos-
sibly, God cannot actualize a world devoid of moral evil that also contains 
creatures enjoying significant free will. And this crucial part of the overall 
defense depends upon a modal judgment that, possibly, everyone suffers 
from transworld depravity. Plantinga characterizes transworld depravity, 
very roughly, as the property a person might have according to which 
he would freely do something morally wrong in any possible world in 
which he could be actualized.4 And “[w]hat is important about the idea 
2Alexander R. Pruss, “A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense,” Faith and Phi-
losophy 29:4 (2012), 400–415.
3Plantinga certainly describes his project in terms of establishing this compatibility; but 
for an argument that this isn’t what was accomplished by the FWD, see Speaks, “Foreknowl-
edge, Evil, and Compatibility Arguments.” (It may need to be emphasized that Speaks is 
not Speak. Jeff Speaks, the author of the noted and noteworthy 2011 article, is clearly much 
smarter than Daniel Speak, the author of the present article. The confusion is natural and 
easy, however. I am sure that I have profited from the confusion in some cases. I suspect, 
therefore, that Jeff Speaks has, unfortunately, been tainted by it. In the interest of fairness, 
then, I should probably do my best to undercut the confusion. Thus, this parenthetical.)
4The definition of transworld depravity that Plantinga initially offered was this:
An essence E suffers from transworld depravity if and only if for every world W such 
that E entails the property is significantly free in W and does only what is right in 
W, there is a state of affairs T and an action A such that
(1) T is the largest state of affairs God strongly actualizes in W,
(2) A is morally significant for E’s instantiation in W,
and
(3) if God had strongly actualized T, E’s instantiation would have gone wrong 
with respect to A.
See The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1974), 188.
 Now almost everyone (including Plantinga) concedes that Richard Otte (2009) has shown 
that this account of transworld depravity will not get the free will defender the result she 
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of transworld depravity,” Plantinga emphasizes, “is that if a person suf-
fers from it, then it was not within God’s power to actualize any world in 
which that person is significantly free but does no wrong—that is, a world 
in which he produces moral good but not moral evil.”5 Now for the crucial 
modal judgment: “But clearly it is possible that everybody suffers from 
transworld depravity.”6
Pruss’s argument against the success of Plantinga’s defense turns on 
an assessment of the modal status of universal transworld depravity. As-
suming standard Molinism, as Plantinga’s defense does, Pruss claims to 
be able to show that God could have actualized a world in which human 
beings are significantly free and yet in which they never act wrongly. If 
the argument goes through, then it demonstrates that universal tran-
sworld depravity is not, contrary to Plantinga’s defense, possible after all. 
In essence, then, Pruss claims that Molinism, together with some adjunct 
premises, entails that at least some creatures do not suffer from transworld 
depravity and thus that it was within God’s power to create a world with 
moral good but without moral evil.
A crucial element of Pruss’s argument is what he calls the Domination 
Principle:7
(DP) Necessarily: If (a) C and C* are antecedents appropriate to <x freely 
chooses A>, (b) C* dominates C for x choosing A and (c) C→(x freely chooses 
A), then C*→(x freely chooses A).
If DP is true, then it stands to explain the intuition Plantinga announced 
regarding Mayor Curley Smith’s bribe. If Curley has freely accepted a 
bribe of $35,000, then we should be able to trust in the truth of this related 
counterfactual:
(Bigger Bribe) If Curley had been offered $36, 000, he would freely have 
taken the bribe.
Since the offer of $36, 000 obviously dominates the offer of $35, 000 (setting 
aside a few weird possible cases), DP accounts for what seems to us to be 
the truth of (Bigger Bribe).
Pruss contends that if we do accept some domination principle like DP, 
then it will be possible, by virtue of domination, for God to actualize a 
world in which there are free beings who do not choose wrongly. Here is 
his case. Suppose that wj is a world in which God forbids Eve from eating 
wants—namely, that it is possible everyone suffers from it. Nevertheless, Otte has also shown 
that some slight modifications, quite clearly in keeping with Plantinga’s initial intentions, 
can avoid the problems and permit the reformed version of transworld depravity to function 
just as well within the rest of the FWD.
5Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity, 186.
6Ibid., 186.
7The intuitive idea behind “dominance” as Pruss is thinking about it seems to be of one 
circumstance dominating another for an agent’s action by containing all the same “pros” for 
the action and some additional ones (or fewer “cons”).
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the apple, and in which she does not eat the apple but dances a jig instead 
(and further suppose that eating the apple and dancing the jig are the 
only two options for her). Suppose also that there is a world wa in which 
God forbids Eve from eating the apple but, unfortunately, in which Eve 
nevertheless eats the apple. Parallel to these worlds, Pruss asks us also 
to suppose that wj* is a world just like wj except that in wj* God forbids 
Eve from dancing a jig (and not from eating the apple). Nevertheless, she 
still dances the jig as she does in wj. Finally, grant that there is a world 
wa* that is just like wa except that in wa* God forbids Eve from dancing a 
jig (and not from eating the apple). Nevertheless, she still eats the apple 
as she does in wa. What Pruss notes is that both wj and wa* are “morally 
perfect” worlds. In both, there is significant creaturely freedom and no 
one does wrong. If God can guarantee that either wj or wa* is actualized, 
then God can indeed actualize a possible world with freedom and without 
wrongdoing, contrary to the supposition of the possibility of universal 
transworld depravity; and Pruss does think that, given Molinism, God can 
in fact guarantee that one or the other of these worlds is actualized.
How? Well, keep in mind that God knows the truth of all the true con-
ditionals of free will. So if it is true that if God had prohibited Eve from apple 
eating (C), then Eve would have freely danced a jig (J), then God knows this. 
And if God does know this CCF, then God can bring it about that Eve 
freely dances a jig by bringing it about that (C) is the case—by prohibiting 
her apple eating. Similarly, if it is true that if God had prohibited jig dancing 
(C*), then Eve would have freely eaten the apple (A), then God knows this. And 
if God knows this CCF, then God can bring it about that Eve freely eats 
the apple by bringing it about that (C*) is the case—by prohibiting her 
jig dancing. Pruss’s strategy from here is to attempt to show that one or 
the other of these two counterfactual conditionals is true. In other words, 
either C→J or C*→A is true (where “→” indicates the counterfactual con-
ditional). To execute this strategy, Pruss argues that the denial of the first 
of these conditionals materially implicates the second. Thus, he thinks he 
can demonstrate that if ~(C→J), then C*→A. For we should allow, Pruss 
argues, that if ~(C→J) is true, then C→~J is true.8 Furthermore, since Eve’s 
only choice is between eating the apple and dancing a jig, we can see that 
C→A follows from C→~J. Now, for the crucial role of the dominance 
principle. Given DP, we can infer C*→A from C→A. This is because C* 
dominates C in the relevant sense. The only thing that is different between 
C* and C is God’s prohibition. If Eve eats the apple when prohibited from 
doing so, then she will also eat the apple when she is not prohibited from 
doing so (when she is prohibited, instead, from dancing a jig).
This means that either C→J or C*→A is true. Whichever is true, God 
knows this. As a result, God can guarantee a morally perfect world. If C→J 
is true, then God will be able to get a morally perfect world by bringing it 
8By an application of the conditional law of excluded middle (CLEM) for counterfactuals 
of creaturely freedom—which, according to Pruss, the standard Molinist accepts.
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about that C is the case, thereby actualizing wj. If C*→A is true, then God 
will be able to get a morally perfect world by bringing it about that C* is 
the case, thereby actualizing wa*. Since all of the premises of this argument 
are supposed to be necessary truths, the conclusion is that, necessarily, 
there is a morally perfect world that God can actualize. That is, it is not 
possible that everyone suffers from transworld depravity—and, therefore, 
Plantinga’s defense fails, depending as it does on this possibility.
2. Reply
To see why I do not think we should be persuaded by this argument to 
conclude that Plantinga’s defense fails, we need to turn to the conditions 
that must be met by a compelling counter-defense. Since the proponent of 
the logical argument from evil is accusing theism simpliciter of inconsis-
tency, and since the free will defender has offered a set of propositions that 
the theist could, it appears, reasonably endorse and that avoid inconsis-
tency, the counter-defender (like Pruss here, with his black hat on) needs 
to show us that this is only an appearance. Pruss must show, that is, that 
the propositions the theist must accept (together with those propositions 
constitutive of the defense) involve an inconsistency. Granting for the sake 
of argument that Pruss’s argument is valid, the question before us, then, 
is whether the premises of his argument are among the propositions that 
the theist must accept. And here I think the answer is pretty clearly that 
they are not.
The propositions that the theist (merely qua theist) must accept are 
those essential to theism together with those that are plausibly regarded 
as necessary truths. So, consider the crucial dominance principle DP. Pruss 
frames it as a necessary truth according to which an agent who freely 
performs an action under one set of conditions will also freely perform 
the action under dominating conditions. DP doesn’t appear to express a 
proposition essential to theism. This means that for the invocation of DP 
to function properly in an argument to the conclusion that the FWD fails, 
it will have to be that DP is reasonably thought to be a necessary truth. 
But remember, also, that (given the goals of the logical problem) it is the 
theist merely qua theist who must reasonably think that DP is a necessary 
truth. In other words, DP can function properly in an argument against 
Plantinga’s free will defense only if it would be in the neighborhood of 
incoherent for the theist to reject DP. And surely it isn’t.
I myself think that DP is flatly false, but I won’t try to argue for this 
conclusion here (in part because the argument would take up too much 
space and in part because doing so would have the potential to mislead 
us about where the dialectical burdens lie).9 For all that needs to be shown 
9To gesture at the shape of such an argument, however, consider this intriguing counter-
example to DP presented to me in correspondence by Mike Rea. DP suggests that a teenager 
who would be rational to freely accept a babysitting job offered at $10 per hour would also 
be rational to freely accept the same babysitting job offered at $1 billion per hour. But, as 
Rea rightly insists, a babysitter offered $1 billion per hour “ought to become very suspicious 
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is that it is not incoherent for the theist (merely qua theist) to reject DP. To 
do this briefly, consider the case that Pruss makes for the domination prin-
ciple. One aspect of this case involves the supposed explanatory power of 
the principle with respect to this supposed truth regarding Curley Smith’s 
bribe:
(2) If any consideration in favor of taking the smaller bribe would apply at 
least as well to the larger and any consideration there would be against tak-
ing the larger bribe also in fact applied at least as well to the smaller, and 
if Smith prefers more money to less money, then: Smith is offered a larger 
bribe → Smith (still) freely accepts the bribe.10
Since DP stands to explain this supposed datum, it gives us a reason to 
accept DP. But must we accept this supposed datum? More specifically, 
must the theist (merely qua theist) accept this datum? Not clearly. Libertar-
ians are bound to be suspicious about it. Here’s a story that would make 
the suspicions coherent. When Smith was considering the bribe of $35,000, 
imagine that it was a very close call for him. But he wasn’t wavering on 
the price. He was wavering over the tension between the competing moral 
and prudential considerations. Since it was a free choice, he could have re-
jected the bribe on the basis of the moral considerations that were bumping 
around in his mind with some real force at the time of his actual decision 
to take the bribe. Furthermore, the extra $1,000 in the dominating case 
would have been essentially irrelevant to Smith. The question for him was 
about which kinds of considerations (moral or prudential) to be moved 
by. And since it was a close call in the actual case, and since the dollar 
value was irrelevant, he might freely have rejected the bribe had he been 
offered $36,000. That is, Pruss’s (2) need not be taken as a datum requiring 
explanation—in terms of a domination principle like DP or whatever. In 
fact, the coherence of this story about Curley should be enough, by itself, 
to show that the libertarian (whether a theist or not) need not accept DP.
By way of reply, Pruss might reiterate another point he has made in 
favor of his domination principle. He insists that, “[t]he most promising 
approach to responding to the randomness objection [to libertarianism] 
appears to be to hold that choices are always made because of consider-
ations, even when the choices are not determined by these considerations. 
. . . But if choices are made because of considerations, libertarians, whether 
Molinist or not, should accept [a dominance principle].”11 However, in 
the case I’ve given, Curley would be making his free choice to reject the 
$36,000 bribe because of considerations; namely, the moral ones—that, as it 
happens didn’t quite move him to action when he was offered $35,000, but 
very well could have (it was a close call, after all).
and reject the proposal—and this even if, ceteris paribus, he or she would prefer $1 billion 
to $10.” 
10Pruss, “A Counterexample to Plantinga’s Free Will Defense,” 403.
11Ibid., 404.
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Close-call Curley also helps to fill in the aporia in an argument Pruss 
highlights in responding to an objection roughly like the one I am ad-
vancing here. Pruss notes that libertarians to whom he has presented his 
argument have been inclined to reject the dominance principle; pointing, 
in some cases, to what he calls the Counterfactual Repeat Intuition (CRI) 
by way of justification:
(CRI) If an agent freely chooses A in circumstances C, then it is possible that 
if the memories of her choice and of its consequences were deleted and she 
were put for a second time in circumstances just like C, she would or at least 
might choose differently from how she did the first time.12
Pruss claims to accept CRI but also insists that he can see no good route 
from it to the denial of his dominance principle. Perhaps I can help.
If an agent can freely choose differently in a repeat situation without 
running afoul of the requirement to choose on the basis of considerations, 
then the considerations on the basis of which the agent chooses on the 
first run must be different from those on basis of which she chooses on 
the repeat run. If the choice were based on the same considerations in 
both scenarios, we would lack an intelligible account of the difference in 
outcome. Thus, someone who accepts CRI has already accepted the basic 
conditions of my close-call Curley case. That is, he has already accepted 
that an agent is able to freely choose to perform an action on the basis of 
(say) prudential considerations while also being able, under the very same 
circumstances, to freely choose to perform an alternative action on the 
basis of (say) moral considerations. Plausibly, however, the deliberation 
an agent engages in when deciding whether to act on either prudential 
or moral considerations need not respect the simple dominance calculus 
that principles like DP presuppose. If I am on the fence about whether to 
break a promise to a friend to pick her up at the airport in order to make 
use of an offer of free tickets to a concert, there is no reason to suppose 
that adding free hot dogs to the concert experience will so much as move 
the deliberative needle. It might; but it need not, because what I am trying 
to decide is which kind of considerations to act on—and the hot dogs 
may reasonably be irrelevant to that determination, being just more of 
the prudential considerations themselves. It is this thought that animates 
my version of close-call Curley. If Curley is sincerely torn between the de-
mands of morality and the call of personal gain, then there is no reason to 
suppose that an extra $1,000 is a difference-maker. And if the extra money 
is not a difference-maker, and one is already prepared to accept CRI, then 
it will also be reasonable to think that close-call Curley might have freely 
refused the bribe at $36,000, his willingness to accept the bribe at $35,000 
notwithstanding. Thus, there is, after all, a fairly strong argument from 
CRI to the denial of DP.
12Ibid., 410.
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Put in terms of Pruss’s Eve cases, rejecting DP on the basis of the above 
sort of reasoning amounts to allowing that even if Eve freely chooses to 
dance a jig when she is commanded by God not to do so, she might freely 
choose not to dance a jig (freely choose instead to eat the apple) when 
she is commanded by God not to eat the apple. The fact that jig dancing 
dominates in the second case may not result in jig dancing. How could 
this be? Consider a parallel with close-call Curley. The considerations that 
Eve takes to favor jig dancing have to do with merriment. The consider-
ations she takes to favor eating the apple have to do with yumminess. But 
in the original case, suppose it is a close call for Eve whether she freely 
allows herself to be moved by merriment to dance the jig or by yummi-
ness to eat the apple. In fact, holding everything fixed, and running a 
repeat on the situation, she would dance the jig about 50 percent of the 
time, let’s suppose. Suppose further that what God commands is not a 
difference-maker for her under these conditions and plays almost no role 
in her initial deliberations in circumstances C (when she acted contrary 
to God’s prohibition). By comparison with the values of merriment and 
yumminess, God’s commands do not move her deliberative needle very 
much. What we are imagining is that Eve takes the fact that a certain ac-
tion is commanded by God as some reason in favor of the action but not 
a particularly forceful one, and one not on the same evaluative scale as 
the considerations of merriment and/or yumminess. Then it need not be 
surprising that, though she freely dances a jig when commanded not to, 
she might nevertheless have eaten the apple had there been no divine pro-
hibition against dancing the jig (as in circumstances C*).
I take this line of reply to put substantial pressure on the claim that 
Pruss’s Eve case constitutes a counterexample to Plantinga’s FWD. To 
function as a counterexample, it must be incumbent upon the theist to 
accept the various elements of the case. However, since DP is neither a 
proposition essential to theism nor reasonably regarded as a necessary 
truth (as my argument just demonstrated), it cannot be forced upon the 
theist in the way demanded of a counterexample to Plantinga’s FWD.
3. Modifying DP?
For all of this, it may not be the end of the story. It may still be possible 
for Pruss to respond by weakening his domination principle. All my argu-
ment has shown, he might claim, is that a general version of DP can be 
resisted by the proponent of the free will defense. Perhaps, however, a 
more specific version—that God could apply in Eve’s case—can be forced 
upon the free will defender. DP allowed Pruss to construct a case in which 
what could be interpreted as a small bit of domination could assure a par-
ticular free choice from Eve. If denying DP blocked this case, it may be that 
Pruss can get the result he wants simply by increasing the domination in 
Eve’s second case and appealing to a weaker domination principle that 
will be harder to resist. For surely it is true that if Eve freely dances a jig in 
circumstances C, then there is some circumstance C** in which jig dancing 
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so significantly dominates apple eating that Eve will definitely choose 
freely to dance the jig. Formalizing this thought a bit, we get:
(DP*) Necessarily, if C is an antecedent appropriate to <x freely chooses 
A>, then there is some C** that dominates C for x choosing A, and is 
such that if C→ (x freely chooses A), then C**→(x freely chooses A).
The force of DP* comes from the fact that, unlike DP, it does not require 
that any amount of dominance with respect to A in circumstances C* 
over circumstances C results in a free choice to A in C*. It insists only 
that there is some circumstance C** that so dominates C with respect to 
freely choosing A that we (and, more importantly, God) can be certain 
that, given that x would freely choose A in C, x would also freely choose 
A in C**. What matters for a Pruss-style objection to the FWD is that it 
certainly seems that the truth of DP* would allow God to get a morally 
perfect world either by bringing it about that C obtains (in the case where 
God knows that C→J) or by bringing it about that C** obtains (in the case 
where God knows, rather, that C**→A).
I concede that DP* is plausible—on my view, substantially more plau-
sible that DP. I also will admit that the Pruss-style argument reconfigured 
in terms of DP* strikes me as quite forceful. That is, I am attracted to the 
conclusion that, given DP*, the total package of theistic commitments 
Plantinga originally deployed to block the logical problem of evil will turn 
out to be incoherent because universal transworld depravity is not pos-
sible after all. But an argument that Plantinga’s defense is a failure cannot 
succeed merely by way of persuading one theist (or even many) that 
universal transworld depravity is impossible. The question is whether 
it would be coherent for a reasonable theist to continue to believe that 
universal transworld depravity is possible, even in the face of the modi-
fied Pruss-style argument based on DP*. The following line of argument 
would, it seems to me, make it reasonable for the Molinist to resist this 
modified argument against the possibility of universal TWD.
To see the argument, we need to remind ourselves that the counter-
defender needs all of the premises of his counterargument to be necessary 
truths. If any of them are not necessary truths, then the bare logical pos-
sibility of all of Plantinga’s premises will have established the bare logical 
compossibility of God and evil. So it is crucial to the Pruss-style argument 
under consideration now that the free will defender be forced, in essence, 
to recognize DP* as expressing a necessary truth. Again, as I said above, 
I am tempted to accept this myself. But I do believe that resistance on 
this point can be coherent. This is because I believe there is an important 
tension between the conditions for free will and conditions for successful 
domination (as expressed in DP*). The reason to resist DP simpliciter, I 
have claimed, is that simple domination may not be enough to guarantee 
action when an agent is in a close-call situation and the deliberations 
involve something like incommensurate values. DP* can avoid this ob-
jection by allowing God to strengthen the domination however much is 
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necessary to satisfy the antecedent of a true CCF with the desirable free-
actional consequent. What is unclear in this case, however, is just how 
much strengthening of the domination (and of what form) will remain 
compatible with the significance of the free will that is part of both the letter 
and the spirit of Plantinga’s original FWD.
DP was supposed to work without undercutting any of our intuitions 
about the deep freedom that agents under light domination would enjoy. 
Adding $1,000 or a divine command favoring the action freely chosen 
without dominance seems to have no effect whatsoever on our sense of 
both the existence and significance of the agent’s free will. This is to say 
that bringing it about that C* obtained appeared to us to represent no 
threat to the freedom that the agent expressed in choosing A under these 
conditions. But must we be so sanguine about the threat when it becomes 
necessary for God to bring about, instead, some C** that will counter what 
we have been referring to as close calls? Not obviously. Since close-call 
Curley isn’t moved much by the $1,000 and close-call Eve isn’t moved 
much by God’s prohibitions, God will have to do more to satisfy the an-
tecedent of the relevant CCF in these (and related) cases. Perhaps he will 
have to add considerably more money to the bribe or a threat to Smith 
family safety in Curley’s case. In Eve’s, maybe he will need to add a strong 
desire in Eve to care about divine prohibitions or a massively increased 
payoff in yumminess for apple-eating. The important thing is that, given 
our argument earlier with respect to close calls, we have no way of being 
sure that only small elements of dominance will issue in the CCFs a Pruss-
style argument will require.
Two possible lines of argument seem to me to be available to the pro-
ponent of Plantinga’s FWD here. Some will be prepared to argue that, 
possibly, no amount of additional dominance sufficient to guarantee the 
desired action will be compatible with the agent’s free choice. That is, 
some may be inclined to argue that even DP* can be rejected since it is 
possible that no one who would freely perform an action under conditions 
C would freely perform the same action under dominated conditions that 
nevertheless preserve the agent’s freedom. Of course, there are some condi-
tions under which the dominance would guarantee that the agent act in 
the desired way—but, possibly, all such strengthening will have to go 
beyond the limits of free will. Thus, it is possible that there is no relevant 
C** for DP*.
Another possible line of reply would be to allow that DP* is strictly 
true but to insist that, possibly, all of the ways in which DP* is true involve 
a crucial degradation of the freedom agents express under the relevant 
dominance. The argument here would then amount to the claim that DP* 
cannot generate the form of conclusion that is relevant to a rejection of the 
free will defense. In favor of this line of argument is the fact that the pres-
ervation of an insignificant form of free will (akin to the freedom to choose 
between soup or salad at lunch) would not be enough to undermine the 
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FWD since, as Plantinga emphasized, the freedom of will in question is 
presumed to ground a suite of morally important properties for human 
beings. What the proponent of the FWD might reasonably claim, then, is 
that, possibly, all the forms of dominance that could issue in true CCFs 
with the desired actional consequents would so diminish the remaining 
free will as to be unfit for its deep moral tasks. And notice that the theist 
could affirm this possibility without insisting that DP* is false.
Suppose, for example, that the C** required to get Curley to choose 
freely to accept the bribe involves a threat to his family. Or suppose that 
the C** required to get Eve to choose freely to eat the apple involves a 
massive increase in the perceived yumminess of the apple. In such cases, 
it is not incredible that while something properly called free will remains, 
its moral significance is substantially diminished. As a parallel, Aristotle’s 
ship captain is relevant. The captain throws the cargo overboard during 
a storm in order to weather it safely. The question is whether he throws 
the cargo overboard freely (“voluntarily” in Aristotle’s terms).13 Aquinas 
considers this case and concludes that the action is partially free and par-
tially unfree.14 There are textual puzzles about how to interpret his claims 
on this point, of course. What matters, though, is that most will share the 
intuitive judgment that there is an important respect in which the context 
of the ship captain’s action mitigates its moral significance even when we 
continue to allow that the action is free under some description. The same 
seems to be true when, for example, a person gives up her wallet at gun-
point. There is some sense in which she does so freely—she had available 
to her the option of forcing the gunman to kill her to get it. But it is not a 
sense in which her moral claim on the wallet has been forfeited, as pre-
sumably it would be if she had given it up in response to a mere request. 
The point is that free choices can be made in contexts that undermine their 
moral significance to such a degree that very little by way of the standard 
supervenience of the moral life upon such choices would make much 
sense. The proponent of Plantinga’s FWD can make use of these points 
in response to the Pruss-style dominance argument deploying DP*. Once 
the possibility is raised that all sufficient dominance would diminish the 
moral significance of the choices, it becomes incumbent upon the counter-
defender to show that this is not possible. Nothing in Pruss’s argument 
even purports to do this.
4. Conclusion
Since the proponent of the FWD can reject DP and either resist DP* or grant 
it but deny that it can function to get the conclusion the counter-defender 
13Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin (Hackett Publishing Company, 
1999), 30.
14St. Thomas Aquinas, Treatise On Happiness, trans. John A. Oesterle (University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1983), 76. (ST IaIIae6.6).
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needs, I conclude that a Pruss-style dominance objection does not threaten 
the success of Plantinga’s original response to the logical problem of evil.15
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Daniel Howard-Snyder, Alexander Pruss, and (most especially) Tom Flint. 
